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1 Introduction
This paper explores a durable-goods monopolist threatened by entry via a new generation of
the durable good. It will be shown that the durability of the good either acts as an entry barrier
itself or creates an opportunity for the incumbent firm to deter entry by limit pricing. As a con-
sequence, the industry tends to remain monopolized, with successive generations of the durable
good being introduced by the incumbent monopolist. These results may have implications for
empirical studies on innovation and entry dynamics as well as antitrust policies.
It is often argued that Coasian pricing dynamics in a durable-goods monopoly warrants
the competitiveness of that industry, even in the absence of competitors. The reason is that a
durable-goods monopolist will optimally reduce the price once high-valuation consumers have
bought. Knowing this, even high-valuation consumers will postpone their purchases. Accord-
ingly, prices converge to the competitive level as price adjustments become more frequent. But
the monopolist may attempt to avoid the time-inconsistency problem by limiting the effective
durability of the good. Different possibilities are discussed in the literature: (i) contracts, i.e.
renting the product rather than selling it (Coase (1972), Bulow (1982)), (ii) physical obso-
lescence, i.e. producing shorter useful product lives (Coase (1972), Bulow, (1986)), and (iii)
innovation, i.e. inventing and introducing a new generation of the good (Waldman (1993),
Fudenberg and Tirole (1998), Lee and Lee (1998)).
However, the picture may change when the existence of a potential entrant is taken into
account. As Bucovetsky and Chilton (1986) and Bulow (1986) demonstrate, the incentives to
rent or produce short-lived products may be reversed when the monopolist is faced with a future
entrant who can produce the same good. Higher durability limits future demand and, hence,
future profits. This may prevent entry when entry is costly.
The present paper focuses on the interplay between Coasian pricing dynamics and the in-
centives for innovation in a durable-goods monopoly when potential competitors threaten to
innovate as well. More precisely, we ask whether the durability of the goods creates any op-
portunities for a monopolist to prevent innovative firms from entering the industry, and whether
innovation investments in durable-goods monopolies under entry threat are socially efficient.
The importance of these questions is exemplified by the worldwide interest in the current
antitrust case of the United States versus Microsoft Corporation1. Microsoft is accused of un-
lawfully maintaining its monopoly power by anticompetitive behavior in the software market.
1Case Reference 97-5343: U.S.A. vs. Microsoft.
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In this respect, Liebowitz noted in the Wall Street Journal Europe2 that “the government be-
lieves that Microsoft has merely leveraged its control over operating systems to dominate the
software market even where its products are clearly inferior to the alternatives.” “Instead,” he
argues, has “Microsoft achieved its success the old-fashioned way - with better products (...)
that have nothing to do with antitrust violations.”
We construct a two-period model in which a new generation of a durable good can be in-
vented and introduced in the second period by the incumbent monopolist or a potential entrant.
The old generation of the durable good lasts two periods so that consumers who buy it in the
first period can use it until the second period. The new generation of the durable good is char-
acterized by a higher quality. Consumers can consume only one unit of the durable good in
each period and have uniformly distributed quality tastes. They can prove the purchase of the
old generation to be eligible for an upgrade discount on the new one.
First, we demonstrate that preemptive innovation cannot prevent entrants from taking over
the technological leadership in the absence of effective patent protection. Our finding is anal-
ogous to Judd’s (1985) result on spatial preemption. The intuition that underlies both of them
is that a multiproduct incumbent firm may optimally respond to entry into one market segment
by withdrawing his product in that segment if postentry price competition reduces demand in
another, monopolized segment of the market. In the context of quality improvement, the argu-
ment obviously holds for durable-goods industries as well as non-durable-goods industries, as
long as the demand for the incumbent’s original product is positively related to the price for the
high-quality version of the good.
Second, we show that a durable-goods monopolist may credibly deter entry by means of
limit pricing. Lowering the price of the old generation of the durable good in the first period
increases first-period demand and hence the number of second-period consumers who are will-
ing to pay only for the incremental utility derived from the new generation of the product over
the old one. Interestingly, this may prevent the entrant from investing in innovation without
necessarily making the innovation investment unattractive to the incumbent. The reason is that
innovation by the potential entrant results in price competition with vertically differentiated
products, while innovation by the incumbent yields a multiproduct monopoly. In particular,
we show that the entrant would never implement a cross-upgrade policy due to competitive
pressure, whereas the multiproduct monopolist may find it optimal to offer upgrade discounts
2Wall Street Journal Europe, October 21, 1998
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in order to price discriminate between former and new customers. Since competition dissi-
pates post-innovation profits, the entrant’s incentive for innovation is smaller than that of the
incumbent monopolist.
Third, we demonstrate that entry deterrence by limit pricing may lead to consumer leapfrog-
ging. That is, consumers who have bought the old product do not upgrade to the new version,
while others who have not obtained the old version decide to purchase the new one.
Finally, we show that innovation investments in a durable-goods monopoly under entry
threat are not necessarily desirable from a welfare point of view. When innovation occurs,
inefficiency can take either of two forms: the incumbent may be the single innovator even
though the entrant has lower innovation costs, and vice versa. Furthermore, we show that any
entry-deterrence equilibrium without innovation implies underinvestment in innovation.
The findings appear largely consistent with empirical observations in the software industry
mentioned above. There is a common consent that Microsoft holds a virtual monopoly. But,
as Schmalensee notes in the Boston Globe, “a real monopolist - one who extracted the last
dollar of profit from consumers - would charge hundreds of dollars more for the software that
runs modern PCs.”3 We argue that Microsoft charges low prices to make entry via a new
generation unattractive by flooding the market with the old one. Such a view is supported by
Microsoft’s mission “a PC on every desk and in every home, running Microsoft software”,
and the observation that it is often Microsoft that brings the new generation of products to the
market, and not a competitor. Moreover, upgrade discounts are typically offered by Microsoft
on its own new products, whereas cross-upgrade pricing is rarely observed.
Ever since Schumpeter (1942), there has been a continued interest in the factors that influ-
ence entry into monopolized industries through innovation, as is expressed, for instance, by the
prominent debate between Gilbert and Newbery (1982) and Reinganum (1983). This literature,
however, focuses on non-durable-goods industries. The results indicate that the monopolist will
deter entry by preemptive patenting when he is more concerned with the dissipation of post-
entry profits (known as the efficiency effect) than the cannibalization of his current monopoly
rents (known as Arrow’s (1962) replacement effect), where the latter effect may matter when
there is uncertainty about the innovation date. In our model, the innovation technology is de-
terministic, which eliminates the replacement effect. While patent protection and, hence, the
possibility of preemptive patenting is ignored as well, we show that a durable-goods monopolist
3See The Boston Globe, City Edition, July 10, 1999.
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has nevertheless the means to prevent entry by credible preemptive action when the efficiency
effect matters. The monopolist may charge a low price to flood the market with the old genera-
tion of the good before entry takes place.
The idea behind limit pricing in our model differs from that put forth by Milgrom and
Roberts (1982). In Milgrom and Roberts’ model, limit pricing is based on asymmetric informa-
tion between the entrant and the incumbent about the incumbent’s cost of production, while our
paper assumes complete information. Furthermore, in our paper limit pricing, when exercised,
removes the possibility of entry unambiguously. This is consistent with the original idea of
limit pricing due to Bain (1949). By contrast, Milgrom and Roberts’ result is ambiguous on the
probability of entry.
Complete-information limit pricing as an entry-deterrence practice has previously been at-
tributed to suppliers of network goods. Katz and Shapiro (1992) and more recently Fudenberg
and Tirole (1999) show that an incumbent may charge low prices to build a large installed base
of users of a network good in order to deter entry with an incompatible product. These pa-
pers, however, assume away any Coasian pricing dynamics and incentives for upgrade pricing
which are associated with many durable-goods industries. Entry deterrence by limit pricing
relies therefore solely on the presence of network externalities in the demand for compatible
products. By contrast, our paper attributes entry deterrence by limit pricing solely to the dura-
bility of the goods in the complete absence of any network externalities. We believe that the
arguments are complementary in nature.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a two-period model of
a durable-goods monopoly threatened by entry through innovation. Section 3 analyzes the
subgames after the innovation decisions. Section 4 provides main analysis of the whole game.
Section 5 discusses welfare implications, and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a two-period model of a durable-good market. In period 1, the market is monopolized
by an incumbent, I . The incumbent produces a durable good, associated with quality level sL,
that lasts two periods after which it vanishes. Between period 1 and period 2, the incumbent can
invest in innovation, which enables him to produce a new generation of the good, characterized
by the higher quality level sH = (sL + s), s > 0. Hence, conditional on innovation, the
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incumbent may sell both generations of the good in period 2, the low-quality one and the high-
quality one. There is also a potential entrant, E. By investing in innovation, the entrant is able
to produce and sell the new generation of the good with quality sH in period 2. Variable costs
of production are independent of quality and set equal to zero. Following Fudenberg and Tirole
(1998), we assume that the quality improvement is not too large:4
sL > s (A1)
It is further assumed that the firms cannot change the quality when the good is already produced.
On the demand side, there is a continuum of consumers with different utility from con-
sumption of the durable good. Each consumer is associated with a type  which is known only
to himself. Consumer types are uniformly distributed over the range [0; 1]. Consumers may
consume at most one unit of the durable good in each period. The consumer of type  gets
utility si from consumption of the good of quality si per period, i = L;H: There is no exter-
nality among the consumers such as, for example, a network effect. Consumers and firms have
a common discount factor which is normalized to 1. There is no second-hand market.
The firms and consumers face the following multi-stage game. At the beginning of pe-
riod 1, the incumbent sets a price for the original durable good. Consumers choose whether
to purchase the good in period 1 or not. Hence, after period 1, the market divides into the
following two segments: (i) the “upgrade market”, which consists of the consumers who have
purchased the good in period 1 and may want to upgrade in period 2 if that is an option, and
(ii) the “new-purchase market”, which consists of the consumers who have not purchased in
period 1. Between the end of period 1 and the beginning of period 2, the incumbent and the
potential entrant simultaneously choose whether to invest in innovation which encompasses the
invention and introduction of a new generation of the product to the market. The innovation
costs are KI  0 and KE  0 for the incumbent and the entrant, respectively. We allow the
firms to observe the outcome of innovation game instantaneously. At the beginning of period 2,
each firm decides whether to withdraw any product that it is able to produce from any market at
zero cost5, and sets a price for each product it wishes to offer in any market. In particular, each
4The assumption is necessary for the uniqueness of equilibrium.
5We follow Judd (1985) in allowing for an intermediate exit stage. Exit is assumed to be costless to apply Judd’s
argument on the non-credibility of spatial preemption and thereby obtain a unique solution for the second-period
pricing subgame. Without this assumption, a certain parameter range would admit multiple equilibria, where one
of them could be part of an entry-deterrence equilibrium similar to that in Gilbert and Newbery’s (1983) model
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potential supplier of the new generation of the good can choose to price discriminate between
consumers with respect to purchase history. That is, we allow the incumbent to give an upgrade
discount to the consumers in the upgrade market, and the entrant to give a cross-upgrade dis-
count to former customers of the incumbent. However, the pricing decision is subject to the
incentive compatibility constraint that the upgrade price cannot exceed the new purchase price,
since consumers in the upgrade market can pretend not to have purchased previously. If the
incumbent wishes to offer the original durable good in period 2, he may set a new price for it.
Finally, consumers choose in period 2 whether to buy any product that is offered.
We use the subgame-perfect equilibrium as the solution for the game.
3 Sales in Period 2
As is standard in the analysis of subgame-perfect equilibrium, we start with the examination
of the second-period play. It comprises two sales decisions by each firm, i.e the decision in
which market to offer any product that can be produced plus the decision of how to price the
respective product, and the purchase decisions of the consumers. These decisions depend on the
sales history in period 1. For this, it is easy to verify the following monotonicity property. If the
consumer of type 1 prefers to purchase in period 1, then all consumers with type   1 prefer
to purchase in period 1 (Fudenberg and Tirole (1998 [Lemma 4])). Hence, we can represent the
sales history by the type of the cutoff consumer 1. Furthermore, the second-period subgame
is associated with four possible innovation histories, which are denoted as follows: N denotes
the history in which no firm has innovated; I and E denote the histories in which only the
incumbent or only the entrant has innovated, respectively; and B denotes the history in which
both firms have innovated. We define four subgames  N ; I ; E; B for each innovation history,
respectively. In this section, we will solve each of them separately.
3.1  N : No Innovation
When no firm has innovated, the incumbent may choose to sell to consumers who have not
purchased in the past, i.e. consumers of types  < 1. Let pL denote the second-period price
for the original, low-quality good. The incentive constraint for the marginal consumer is given
of preemptive patenting. But even in that case, the equilibrium that is unique under costless exit would remain an
equilibrium.
7
by 2sL   pL = 0: Taking account of the incentive constraint, the incumbent’s problem is
max
pL
pL(1  
pL
sL
) (1)
subject to pL=sL < 1, which is solved by
pL =
1
2
sL1. (2)
3.2  I: Innovation by the Incumbent
This subgame has been analyzed by Lee and Lee (1998) for the case of two types of consumers
and by Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) for a general distribution of consumer types. Our analysis
for a uniform distribution of consumer types largely confirms their results. In addition, we
obtain an explicit characterization of the equilibrium which is crucial for the analysis of the
entire game.
Let pU and pH denote the price of the new, high-quality product offered to consumers in
the upgrade market and the new-purchase market, respectively. For a given first-period cutoff
consumer, 1, the incumbent can pursue the following sales strategies. First, the incumbent may
choose to price discriminate between consumers in the upgrade market and consumers in the
new-purchase market. Since upgrade consumers can pretend not to have purchased in period 1,
the incumbent must take the incentive compatibility constraint pU  pH into account. Second,
he can offer the new product to consumers in both markets at a uniform price pU = pH . Third,
he can choose to withdraw the new product from the new-purchase market and sell it only to
consumers in the upgrade market. In addition, he may choose to sell the old product at price
pL. However, since production of either quality is costless, it can easily be shown that the
incumbent finds it optimal to sell only the new product, as long as no incentive compatibility
constraint is binding. The next proposition indicates how the optimal strategy of the incumbent
encompasses the alternative sales strategies depending on the parameter 1.
Proposition 1 Consider subgame  I . Define
z1 
s(sL + s  
p
s
p
(sL + 2s))
ssL + s2L   s
2

z2 
s
sL + s
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where 0 < z1 < z2 < 1=2.
1. If z2 < 1  1, the incumbent sells the new product in the upgrade market at the price
pU =
(
1s if 12 < 1  1
1
2s if z2 < 1  12
(3)
and in the new-purchase market at the price
pH =
1
2
(sL + s)1, (4)
where pU < pH for z2 < 1 < 1.
2. If z1 < 1  z2, the incumbent sells the new product in both markets, the upgrade market
and the new-purchase market, at the uniform price
pU = pH =
1
2
s
sL + s
sL + 2s
(1 + 1). (5)
3. If 0  1  z1, the incumbent sells the new product only in the upgrade market at the
price6
pU =
1
2
s (6)
and the old product in the new-purchase market at the price given by (2).
Proposition 1 reveals that the incumbent will price discriminate between customers with
different purchase history by offering an upgrade discount to those who have purchased in
period 1, provided that the upgrade market is not too large (statement 1). Two effects matter for
this result: First, consumers in the new-purchase market are willing to pay (sL + s), while
those in the upgrade market are willing to pay only s for the incremental utility. This implies
a higher new-purchase price (the reservation-utility effect). Second, as the upgrade market gets
large, the maximal valuation among the consumers in the new-purchase market decreases. This
drives the new-purchase price down relative to the upgrade price (the ratchet effect). For a
large upgrade market, the ratchet effect dominates the reservation utility effect such that the
6For 1 = z1, the incumbent is indifferent between the policies described in statements 2 and 3. We assume
that for 1 = z1 he chooses to sell the new product only in the upgrade market.
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incentive compatibility constraint pU = pH is binding. The incumbent charges then a uniform
price for the new product (statements 2 and 3). When the upgrade market gets very large, the
optimal uniform price will exceed the maximal willingness to pay of any consumer in the new-
purchase market. The incumbent can therefore gain from foregoing sales of the new product in
the new-purchase market entirely (statement 3).
Finally, we shall analyze whether there are consumers who possess the old product and do
not upgrade to the new version, while there are others who have not bought the old version and
decide to purchase the new one. Such consumer leapfrogging implies that a consumer with a
higher valuation may use a product of lower quality than a consumer with a lower valuation.
The analysis might therefore be of an independent interest in the context of technology adoption
as discussed in the growth literature.
Corollary 1 Leapfrogging occurs in  I if z1 < 1 < 1=2.
Corollary 1 indicates that leapfrogging may take place in  I for a range of the first-period
sales history. Note that this does not imply that leapfrogging occurs in the overall game.
3.3  E: Innovation by the Entrant
When the entrant is the only innovator, he can monopolize the upgrade market but faces price
competition between vertically differentiated goods in the new-purchase market. While the
incumbent’s strategy set is simply a choice of pL  0, the entrant’s strategy set is composed of
the following sales policies. First, the entrant can price discriminate between the consumers in
the new-purchase market and those in the upgrade market by giving a cross-upgrade discount
pU < pH . Second, he can charge a uniform price in both markets pU = pH . Third, he can
forego sales in the new-purchase market completely. As a preliminary step, we show in the
next lemma that a cross-upgrade discount is never optimal for the entrant. Proposition 2 then
summarizes the equilibrium behavior in  E .
Lemma 1 Price discrimination between consumers with respect to purchase history is never
optimal for the entrant.
Lemma 1 is due to the competition between the entrant and the incumbent in the new-
purchase market which calls for a low new-purchase price pH . The proof of the lemma estab-
lishes that this competition effect together with the ratchet effect always dominate the reserva-
tion utility effect so that the incentive compatibility constraint pU  pH is always binding.
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Proposition 2 Consider subgame  E . Define
x1 
(7
p
2  8)sL + (8
p
2  8)s
8sL + 8s
x2 
2sL + 2s
5sL + 6s
x3 
2sL + 2s
3sL + 4s
where 0 < x1 < x2 < 1=2 < x3 < 1.
1. If x3 < 1  1, the entrant sells the new product in both markets at the uniform price
pH = pU = 2s
sL + s
3sL + 4s
(7)
such that the first-period cutoff type 1 prefers to buy the new product. The incumbent
sells the old product at the price
pL = s
sL
3sL + 4s
: (8)
2. If x2 < 1  x3; the entrant sells the new product in both markets at the uniform price
pH = pU = s1 (9)
such that the first-period cutoff type 1 is indifferent between buying the new product or
not. The incumbent sells the old product at the price7
pL =
1
2
s
sL
sL + s
1: (10)
3. If x1 < 1  x2, the entrant sells the new product in both markets at the uniform price
pH = pU = 2s
sL + s
7sL + 8s
(1 + 1) (11)
such that the first-period cutoff type 1 prefers not to buy the new product. The incumbent
7For 1 = x3, the entrant is indifferent between the policies described in statements 1 and 2 of this Proposition.
We assume that for 1 = x3 firms coordinate on the strategies specified in statement 2, since it yields a higher
profit for the incumbent.
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sells the old product at the price
pL = s
sL
7sL + 8s
(1 + 1): (12)
4. If 0  1  x1; the entrant sells the new product only to consumers in the upgrade market
at the price
pU =
1
2
s: (13)
The incumbent sells the old product at the price given by (2).8
5. The entrant’s profit in  E is continuous and weakly increasing in 1.
The proposition exhibits an interesting discontinuity at 1 = x1. As 1 falls from above
x1 below that value, the entrant stops selling the new product to new-purchase consumers, and
the price of the new durable good jumps upwards to pU = (1=2) s (statements 3 and 4).
The reason is that for a sufficiently large upgrade market, i.e. 1  x1, it is profitable for the
entrant to avoid competition in the new-purchase market. Note that the optimal upgrade price
does not depend on the low end of the upgrade market, when the upgrade market is already
of substantial size (statement 4). For a smaller upgrade market, i.e. 1 > x1, the entrant is
subject to substantial competitive pressure from the incumbent who continues selling the old
durable good. The competitive pressure prevents the entrant from price-discriminating between
upgrade consumers and new-purchase consumers (statements 1-3 and Lemma 1).
Finally, similar to the previous subsection we analyze the consumers’ equilibrium purchase
decision and check whether leapfrogging is possible in subgame  E:
Corollary 2 If x1 < 1 < x2, leapfrogging occurs in  E .
The corollary shows that consumer leapfrogging may occur in  E for a range of the first-
period sales history. The range is similar to the case of  I , but it is narrower.
8For 1 = x1, the entrant is indifferent between the policies described in statements 3 and 4. We assume
that for 1 = x1 firms coordinate on the strategies specified in statement 4, since it yields a higher profit for the
incumbent.
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3.4  B: Innovation by Both Firms
Consider the subgame where both firms have innovated. In this case, the incumbent can sell
both goods, the old one and the new one, while the entrant can sell only the new version. We
will demonstrate, however, that the incumbent prefers to offer only the old product.
Proposition 3 In subgame  B; it is optimal for the incumbent to withdraw the new product
entirely and sell only the old product.
Proposition 3 describes a striking result. When both firms introduce the new version of
the durable good, the optimal response of the incumbent is to withdraw the new product from
both markets, the upgrade market and the new-purchase market. The result can be explained
as follows. If the incumbent remains in both markets, Bertrand price competition drives the
new-purchase price and the upgrade price down to zero. As a consequence, the price for the old
product is zero as well. Hence, each firm makes zero profits. It is obvious that the entrant cannot
gain by exiting either market, which yields zero profits as well. However, the incumbent may
want to avoid the price competition in the new-purchase market in order to generate positive
profits with the old product. Since the old product is directly competing against the new one,
the incumbent has an incentive to withdraw the new product from the new-purchase market.9
Moreover, the incumbent can do even better by withdrawing the new product from the
upgrade-market as well and offering only the old product, as with history E. To understand
this point, remember that for history E the entrant charges a uniform price for the new product
in both markets as the incentive compatibility constraint pU  pH is binding (Lemma 1). This
price is higher than the entrant’s optimal (unconstrained) new-purchase price. It is clear that
the incumbent benefits from a higher price charged by its rival. Hence, when both markets
are linked by the incentive compatibility constraint, as with history E, the incumbent is actu-
ally better off relative to when markets are separated, as with history B and free upgrading.
Corollary 3 follows immediately from Proposition 3.
Corollary 3 In  B the incumbent and the entrant make the same profit as in  E . Leapfrogging
occurs under the same circumstances as in  E .
It is interesting to note that this result implies that innovation has no preemptive power in
deterring an entry, in contrast to the previous debate between Gilbert and Newbery (1982) and
9A similar result has been obtained by Judd (1985) for a multiproduct incumbent with horizontally differenti-
ated goods who is threatened by an entrant.
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Reinganum (1983). The difference follows from the multiple product feature of the present
model.
4 Sales in Period 1
The analysis of the second-period subgame in the previous section allows us to solve for the
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the entire game. There are two stages at which the incumbent
makes decisions prior to the second-period sales: the pricing decision in the first period and the
innovation investment decision immediately before the second period.
The payoff matrix at the time of the innovation decision, given the costs KI and KE for the
incumbent and the entrant, respectively, is given by Table 1, in which the incumbent is the row
player and the entrant is the column player. hj (1) denotes the second-period optimal profit
accruing to firm j as a function of the first-period sales level 1, where the subscript j = I; E
represents the incumbent and the entrant, and the superscript h = N; I; E;B, represents the
innovation history.
No Innovation Innovation
No Innovation NI (1) ; 0 EI (1) ; EE (1) KE
Innovation II (1) KI ; 0 EI (1) KI ; EE (1) KE
Table 1: Payoff Matrix for Second Period
Rolling back we can write the total profit of the incumbent as a function of 1:
(1) = p1(1  1) + 
h
I (1) KIIfh = I; Bg (14)
where p1 is the first-period price that generates the marginal consumer of type 1, and Ifg is
an indicator function. The incumbent’s optimal strategy at the beginning of the whole game is
to choose a first-period price p1 that maximizes (1):
Define KE = f1

EE(1)  KE g, namely the set of sales history which yields a non-
positive profit to the entrant when entry via innovation takes place.10 The incumbent can prevent
10We assume that the entrant stays out, i.e. chooses not to innovate, if the profit from entry is zero.
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entry by setting the first-period price in such a way that all consumers of type   1 2 KE
purchase in the first period. We call KE the no-entry set.
Using Bain’s terminology, we distinguish between three forms of first-period behavior:
blockaded entry, where the incumbent chooses a first-period price as if there were no entry
threat, but no entry occurs; deterred entry, where entry cannot be blockaded, but is prevented
through limit pricing; and accommodated entry, where the incumbent prefers a first-period
price that does not prevent entry, and entry occurs. The subgame-perfect equilibrium of the en-
tire game has different properties, depending on whether entry takes place or not. We analyze
first the no-entry equilibrium in which entry is either blockaded or deterred, then the entry equi-
librium in which entry is accommodated, and finally, we examine how the incumbent chooses
in the first stage between the two equilibrium paths if both are available.
4.1 No-Entry Equilibrium
In the no-entry equilibrium the incumbent maximizes the total profit subject to the constraint
that the first-period sales prevent entry. Hence, the second-period subgame is either  N or  I .
We can write the incumbent’s optimization problem as
max
f1;h=N;Ig
(1) = p1(1  1) + 
h
I (1) KIIfh = Ig, (15)
subject to 1 2 KE .
The incumbent can prevent entry only when he has the means to impose a non-positive
profit on the entrant in the second period. It is therefore crucial to know when the no-entry set
is non-empty, i.e. KE 6= ;. We will first establish useful properties of the no-entry set.
Lemma 2 1. If KE < 14s, then KE = ;.
2. If KE  14s,11 then KE = [0; KE ] 6= ;, where KE  x1 > 0.
The first part of the lemma implies that the no-entry set is empty if the entrant’s innovation
cost is low. The second part reveals that, if the entrant’s entry cost is high enough, the no-entry
set is non-empty, and the upper bound of the set is greater than or equal to x1. This property has
11The weak inequality follows from our tie-breaking rule that the entrant stays out when the profit is 0.
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an important implication: in solving for the no-entry equilibrium we do not have to consider the
range of 1 smaller than x1. The following proposition characterizes the no-entry equilibrium.
Proposition 4 1. In the no-entry equilibrium without innovation,
(a) if 3=5 < KE  1, the incumbent chooses a first-period price p1 as if there were no
entry threat (blockaded entry),
(b) if x1  KE  3=5, the incumbent sets p1 such that 1 = KE (deterred entry).
2. In the no-entry equilibrium with innovation,
(a) if (3sL + s) = (5sL + s) < KE  1, the incumbent chooses a first-period price
p1 as if there were no entry threat (blockaded entry),
(b) if x1  KE  (3sL + s) = (5sL + s), the incumbent sets p1 such that 1 = KE
(deterred entry).
The proposition shows that the no-entry equilibrium comprises a blockaded-entry equilib-
rium and an entry-deterrence equilibrium. In the latter, the incumbent deters entry by producing
at the boundary of the no-entry set. This reveals that the concept of the limit pricing due to Bain
(1949) is valid in the durable-goods industry. As is well known, an argument which essentially
amounts to the requirement of subgame perfection makes the limit pricing strategy ineffective
in non-durable goods industries that are not characterized by network externalities.12 By con-
trast, our model of a durable-goods monopoly without network externalities indicates that the
incumbent may choose to deter entry by selling more in the first period than in the absence
of any entry threat. The reason is that the second-period demand function is determined by
the first-period sales volume in the case of durable goods, whereas it is independent of the
first-period sales in the case of non-durable goods.
4.2 Entry Equilibrium
The incumbent may choose a strategy that allows entry. Proposition 3 implies that in such a
case the incumbent never innovates. The second-period subgame is then always  E in which the
12For the analysis of limit pricing by suppliers of network goods, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1999).
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incumbent sells only the old product (Proposition 2). Given entry, the incumbent’s optimization
problem in the first period is
max
f1g
(1) = p1(1  1) + 
E
I (1): (16)
The next proposition states the optimal first-period price, given that the entry equilibrium is
played.
Proposition 5 In the entry equilibrium, the incumbent chooses a first-period price p1 such that
1 = x1.
According to Proposition 5 entry accommodation involves a large sales volume in the first
period. In fact it is the maximum quantity the incumbent would be willing to sell for entry deter-
rence (Lemma 2). This intriguing result can be explained by the externality of the incumbent’s
first-period sales.13
Observe that the first-period sales in general affect the incumbent’s second-period sales as
well as the entrant’s second-period sales. Proposition 2 implies that a first-period sales level
of 1 = x1 limits the extent of entry by making the new-purchase market unattractive for the
entrant. By contrast, any 1 above x1 admits competition in the new-purchase market which
lowers the second-period price for the old product and hence the second-period profit for the
incumbent. On the other hand, any 1 below x1 affects the incumbent’s profit through a lower
first-period price as well as a lower second period price. In other words the cost of large first-
period sales is not fully internalized by the incumbent until 1 = x1 when the entrant chooses to
leave the new-purchase market. Once the entrant leaves the new purchase market, further first
period sales affect only the incumbent’s profit since the entrant’s profit comes entirely from the
upgrade market. The result follows since the incumbent never wants to sell as much as 1 = x1
in the absence of innovation. Therefore the discontinuity at 1 = x1 due to the change in the
market structure plays a crucial role for Proposition 5.
13Carlton and Gertner (1989) exploit the same intuition to demonstrate that a durable-goods oligopolist has an
incentive to sell rather than rent for strategic reasons.
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4.3 Choice between Equilibrium Paths
Proposition 5 has an immediate consequence for the choice between the entry equilibrium and
the no-entry equilibrium. The following proposition shows that the incumbent always prevents
entry, whenever he has the means to do so.
Proposition 6 The incumbent plays the entry equilibrium if and only if KE = ;.
As discussed above, the impact of the first-period sales on the second-period market struc-
ture induces the incumbent to set a low first-period price when he plans to accommodate to
entry. However, for KE 6= ; the implied first-period sales volume is larger than the optimal
sales volume under entry deterrence. Hence entry is prevented almost by default even if the
incumbent plans to concede entry. The result indicates that the incumbent in a durable-good
industry enjoys a substantial advantage in securing his monopoly power.
4.4 Consumer Leapfrogging
In this subsection we analyze the consumers’ purchase decision and ask whether and when
leapfrogging occurs.
Proposition 7 Leapfrogging occurs if the entry-deterrence equilibrium with innovation is played
for x1 < KE < 1=2.
In contrast to Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1998) model without entry threat, our model predicts
the occurrence of leapfrogging under a certain condition. The intuition is that the practice of
limit pricing induces some consumers to purchase in period 1 whose valuations are not high
enough to warrant an upgrade in the second period. On the other hand, the even larger first-
period sales volume chosen in the entry equilibrium does not imply consumer leapfrogging,
because the valuation of the consumers who have not purchased in period 1 is so low that
the entrant finds it optimal to serve only the consumers in the upgrade market. These two
observations suggest that the occurrence of leapfrogging can be attributed to the competitive
pressure under entry threat.
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5 Welfare Analysis of Innovation Investment
The threat of entry has the following straightforward effects on social welfare. First, the practice
of limit pricing allows more consumers to consume the durable good compared to the situation
without entry threat. Second, an even higher sales volume is also obtained when entry is ac-
commodated. However, the entry equilibrium entails a loss of efficiency against the first best in
which both product are provided at prices equal to the marginal cost of 0.
In this section we focus on the non-trivial question, albeit of partial nature, of whether the
durable-goods monopolist and the potential entrant have proper incentives to invest in innova-
tion.14 The next proposition shows that when innovation occurs in equilibrium, inefficiency in
innovation can be caused by either firm: the incumbent may innovate even though innovation
by the entrant is more efficient, i.e. KE < KI , while the entrant may innovate even if though
innovation by the incumbent is more efficient, i.e. KI < KE .
Proposition 8 Suppose that innovation occurs in the equilibrium.
1. When KE  14s so that the no-entry equilibrium is played, the incumbent may innovate
even if KE < KI .
2. When KE < 14s so that the entry equilibrium is played, the entrant may innovate even
if KI < KE .
The proposition follows from the fact that the possibility of entry deterrence depends only
on the entrant’s innovation cost and his profit from entry and not on the incumbent’s innovation
cost. When the incumbent successfully deters entry, he may invest in innovation although the
entrant has a cost advantage. On the other hand, the inefficiency in innovation can occur in the
opposite way as well. To see this, note that if the no-entry set is empty, the incumbent is forced
to accommodate entry via the new generation of the durable good. By Proposition 3, however,
the incumbent never innovates in the entry equilibrium, irrespectively of his innovation costs.
The previous proposition has revealed two forms of inefficiency when innovation occurs.
The next proposition discovers an inefficiency when no firm innovates.
Proposition 9 Underinvestment in innovation occurs in any entry-deterrence equilibrium with-
out innovation: the entrant’s innovation cost is lower than the social gain from innovation so
that the entrant’s innovation is welfare-enhancing.
14The question lies at the center of the recent trial on Microsoft although it is admittedly of a more limited
scope. Our approach highlights the most controversial issue in the trial.
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The inutition behind the proposition can be explained using two elements. First when the
entrant has a low innovation cost, the social gain from the consumption of the new durable good
easily dominates the innovation cost. Second even when the entrant has a moderate innovation
cost, the entry deterrence by the incumbent induces inefficiency. The inefficiency increases
with the rise in the entrant’s innovation cost since the first period sales necessary for the entry
deterrence is decreasing in KE . The sum of the benefit of new durable good and the cost of
entry deterrence outweighs the entrant’s innovation cost as long as entry is deterred and not
blockaded since the entrant’s innovation cost is not excessive when entry should be deterred
and not blockaded.
The proposition indicates that the practice of entry deterrence may imply less innovation
than optimal. This finding provides a scope for possible government intervention in encourag-
ing innovation by a potential entrant. Furthermore, the proposition has an interesting implica-
tion for the recent trial of Microsoft, who consistently argued that it faces the correct innovation
incentive because of the time-inconsistency problem in durable-goods industries: once the old
generation of the durable is sold, the firm has to innovate to generate further revenue. A careful
examination of the argument reveals that this is an unwarranted extrapolation of the Coasian
argument to the problem of entry via innovation. Indeed the analysis in this section suggests
that their claim is not true in general.
6 Conclusion
Our result that only one of the firms innovates appears compatible with a few outstanding
cases in computer industry. In the software market for operating systems Microsoft holds a
virtual monopoly while in the computer CPU market Intel holds a comparable position. Our
result indicates that the incumbent in a durable-good industry enjoys a certain degree of entry-
deterrence power.
Although the power to deter entry is not equivalent to the lack of incentive to innovate,
the power allows the incumbent to cause underinvestment in innovation or make an inefficient
innovation decision. It is rather surprising that the inefficiency in innovation may go in the
opposite direction as well, namely that the entrant may innovate even though the incumbent has
a cost advantage in innovation.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that the issue of dynamic competition considered here
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could be crucial for issues of economic growth since durable goods are often used as factors
of production. Hence, results which draw on a careful analysis of entry deterrence in durable-
goods monopoly may provide important implications for policy on growth.
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Appendix
Proof. (Proposition 1)
The incumbent’s optimal second-period policy is given by
max
fpU ;pHg

(1 
pU
s
)pU + (1  
pH
sL + s
)pH

(17)
subject to
pU
s
 1 (18)
pH
sL + s
 1 (19)
pU  pH (20)
Constraint (18) [(19)] implies that the marginal consumer who is willing to pay pU [pH] for
the new product belongs to the upgrade [new-purchase] market. Constraint (20) stems from the
fact that upgrade consumers can pretend not to have purchased in period 1.
Suppose first that (20) is non-binding for some 1. The solution is then
pU =
(
1s if 1 > 12
1
2s if 1 
1
2
(21)
pH =
1
2
(sL + s)1: (22)
Let us now add the incentive compatibility constraint (20). We obtain that, for 1 > 1=2,
pU  pH if and only if s  sL, which is satisfied by assumption (A1), and for 1  1=2,
pU  pH if and only if
1 
s
sL + s
 z2
We conclude that the incumbent will price discriminate if z2 < 1 (statement 1).
Consider next the range of 1 in which (20) is binding, i.e. 1 < z2. The incumbent may
then charge a uniform price for the new product in both markets or offer it only in one market.
In serving both markets, there are in turn three options: (i) either the pricing ensures that the
first-period cutoff type 1 strictly prefers to upgrade, or (ii) is indifferent between upgrading and
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not, or (iii) strictly prefers not to upgrade. We will first consider the different options separately
and compare the resulting profits to determine the optimal sales policy.
Under option (i), optimal uniform pricing is the solution of
max
fpH=pUg
(1 
pH
sL + s
)pH
subject to
1 >
pH
s
pH
sL + s
 1
which yields
pH = pU =
1
2
(sL + s) .
Checking the constraints reveals that the relevant range of 1 for option (i) coincides with the
range in which the incumbent finds it optimal to price discriminate with respect to purchase
history. Hence, option (i) is not chosen.
Under option (ii), the incumbent solves
max
fpH=pUg

(1 
pH
s
)pH + (1  
pH
sL + s
)pH

(23)
subject to
pH
s
 1 (24)
pH
sL + s
 1 (25)
The maximization problem under option (iii) differs from the previous one only in the strict
inequality sign of constraint (24).
The first-order condition for (23) yields
pH = pU =
1
2
s
sL + s
sL + 2s
(1 + 1) (26)
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and the relevant ranges for options (ii) and (iii) are 1 < z2, and s= (2sL + 3s)  1 < z2,
respectively. An inspection of the implied profits reveals that option (iii) yields strictly greater
profits in the relevant range.
To complete the proof of statement 2, we determine the profits obtainable from foregoing
sales of the new product in one of the markets. In particular, the incumbent can choose to offer
the new product only to consumers in the upgrade market and continue to sell the old product
to the consumers in the new-purchase market. The optimal upgrade price and the optimal old-
product price are then given by (21) and (2), respectively. By comparing the profits obtainable
with this policy and options (ii) and (iii), it is easy to verify the following result. There is a
unique value
1 =
s(sL + s  
p
s
p
(sL + 2s))
ssL + s2L   s
2

 z1
with s= (2sL + 3s) < z1 < z2, such that the incumbent prefers to sell the new product in
both markets at a uniform price if z1  1  z2 (statement 2), and prefers to offer the new
product only in the upgrade market along with the old product in the new-purchase market if
0  1 < z1 (statement 3).
Proof. (Corollary 1)
We will analyze each of the ranges of 1, which are specified in statements 1-3 of Proposi-
tion 1 for  I , and check whether leapfrogging occurs. First, for 1=2  1  1, the incumbent
serves the whole upgrade market, which precludes leapfrogging. Second, for z2 < 1 < 1=2,
the incumbent’s optimal prices in the second period are given by (3) and (4) (statement 1 of
Proposition 1). Then pU=s > 1 if 1 < 1=2, and pH= [sL + s] < 1 if 1 > 0. Thus, the
marginal consumer who upgrades in the second period is of a type that is strictly higher than 1,
and the new product is bought by consumers of type below 1, i.e. leapfrogging occurs. Third,
for z1 < 1  z2, the incumbent sells the new product at the optimal uniform price given by (5)
(statement 2 of Proposition 1). Then pH=s > 1 if 1 < [sL + s] = [sL + 3s], which holds
for all 1 < z2: And, pH= [sL + s] < 1 if 1 > s= [2sL + 3s], which holds for 1 > z1, i.e.
leapfrogging occurs. Finally, for 0  z1  1, the new product is sold in the upgrade market
only, which precludes leapfrogging.
Proof. (Lemma 1)
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Given the entrant’s new-purchase price for the new product, pH , the incumbent solves
max
fpLg

pH   pL
s
 
pL
sL

pL (27)
subject to
pH   pL
s
 1 (28)
which yields the incumbent’s reaction function
RL =
1
2
sL
sL + s
pH (29)
for any pH  0.
Given the incumbent’s price for the old product, pL, the entrant solves
max
fpU ;pHg

1 
pU
s

pU +

1  
pH   pL
s

pH

(30)
subject to
pU
s
 1 (31)
pH   pL
s
 1 (32)
pU  pH (33)
Suppose first that the incentive compatibility constraint pU  pH is non-binding for some 1.
The entrant’s optimal upgrade price pU is then the same as given by (21) for  I , while the
new-purchase price is chosen as a best response to the incumbent’s second-period price
RH =
1
2
(s1 + pL): (34)
Solving the firm’s reaction functions (34) and (29) simultaneously yields
pH = 2s
sL + s
3sL + 4s
1 (35)
pL = s
sL
3sL + 4s
1 (36)
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as the unique candidate for the price equilibrium in the new-purchase market. But as we show
in the following the incentive constraint pU  pH is binding for all 1. For 1 > 1=2; pU  pH
if and only if sL + 2s  0, which is never satisfied. For 1  1=2, we obtain that pU  pH if
and only if 1  [3sL + 4s] = [4sL + 4s]. But 1=2 < [3sL + 4s] = [4sL + 4s], hence there
is a contradiction.
Proof. (Proposition 2)
The incumbent’s reaction function has been derived in the proof of Lemma 1 and is repeated
here:
pL =
1
2
sL
sL + s
pH (37)
for any pH  0.
By Lemma 1, the entrant may charge a uniform price for the new product in both markets or
offer it only in one market. As in  I , there are in turn three options in serving both markets: (i)
either the pricing ensures that the first-period cutoff type 1 strictly prefers to upgrade, or (ii) is
indifferent between upgrading and not, or (iii) strictly prefers not to upgrade. We will analyze
each of these options separately and then compare the implied profit levels.
Under option (i), the entrant’s problem for a given price pL is then
max
fpH=pUg

1 
pH   pL
s

pH
subject to
1 >
pH
s
(38)
which yields the entrant’s reaction function
RH = RU =
1
2
(s + pL) (39)
for any pL  0. Solving the reaction functions (37) and (39) simultaneously yields
pH = pU = 2s
sL + s
3sL + 4s
(40)
pL = s
sL
3sL + 4s
(41)
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as the unique candidate for the price equilibrium. Checking the constraint (38) gives the relevant
range for (40) and (41) to be part of an equilibrium:
1 >
2sL + 2s
3sL + 4s
 x3.
Under option (ii), the entrant’s problem for a given price pL is to solve
max
fpH=pUg

(1 
pH
s
)pH + (1  
pH   pL
s
)pH

(42)
subject to
pH
s
 1 (43)
pH   pL
s
 1 (44)
The maximization problem under option (iii) differs from the previous one only in the strict
inequality sign of constraint (43).
The first-order condition yields the reaction function
RH = RU =
1
4
[s(1 + 1) + pL]. (45)
for any pL  0. Note that (45) specifies the best response to (29) only for 1  x3, where x3 is
defined above. Otherwise, options (ii) and (iii) are dominated by option (i). Solving (45) and
(29) simultaneously and taking the constraints into account, yields the unique price equilibrium
pH = pU =
(
s1 if x2 < 1  x3
2s
sL+s
7sL+8s
(1 + 1) if x4  1  x2
(46)
pL =
(
1
2s
sL
sL+s
1 if x2 < 1  x3
s
sL
7sL+8s
(1 + 1) if x4  1  x2
(47)
where
x4 
sL + 2s
6sL + 6s
<
2sL + 2s
5sL + 6s
 x2 <
1
2
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This proves statement 2 of the proposition.
To complete the proof of statement 3, and to prove statement 4, we have to determine
the profits obtainable from ignoring sales in the new-purchase market entirely. The optimal
upgrade price is then the same as given by (3) in Proposition 1 for the incumbent’s optimal
price discrimination strategy. It is easy to show that the resulting profit from selling only in the
upgrade market is higher than the profit from selling in both markets at the uniform price given
by (46) if and only if
0  1 <
(7
p
2  8)sL + (8
p
2  8)s
8sL + 8s
 x1
where x4 < x1 < 1=2 < x3. Statement 3 and 4 follow immediately.
The proof of statement 5 is straightforward and omitted.
Proof. (Corollary 2)
We will analyze each of the ranges of 1 that are specified in Proposition 2 for  E and check
whether leapfrogging occurs. First, for x3 < 1  1, the entrant charges a uniform price given
by (7) such that the cutoff type 1 prefers to buy. In addition, the entrant sells the new product in
the new-purchase market, i.e. no leapfrogging occurs. Second, for x2 < 1  x3, the argument
is similar as for x3 < 1  1. Third, for x1 < 1  x2, the equilibrium prices are given by (11)
and (12) (statement 3 of Proposition 2). It is easy to show that pH=s > 1 if 1 < x2. And
[pH   pL] =s < 1 if 1 > [sL + 2s] = [6sL + 6s] < x1, i.e. leapfrogging occurs if 1 < x2.
Finally, for 0  1  x1, the new product is not sold to consumers in the new-purchase market,
which prevents leapfrogging.
Proof. (Proposition 3)
Consider the incumbent’s strategy of selling both products. The incumbent has three alter-
native sales strategies for the new product. First, selling the new product in both, the upgrade
market and the new-purchase market. Second, selling the new product only in the new-purchase
market. And third, selling the new product only in the upgrade market. Among these sales
strategies, the first two yield zero profit to the incumbent, since Bertrand competition reduces
the price of the new product as well as the price of the old product to 0. The third strategy of of-
fering the new product only in the upgrade market reduces the upgrade price to 0. This strategy
effectively produces the market structure of vertical product differentiation in the new-purchase
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market, with the entrant as is the high-quality firm and the incumbent as the low-quality firm.15
However, the incumbent can gain by withdrawing the new product entirely. It is easy to
verify that the incumbent’s profit obtained in the case of the historyE, in which only the entrant
sells the new product and the incumbent continues to sell the old version, strictly exceeds the
profit obtainable with history B and free upgrading for 1 < 1; and is the same for 1 = 1.
Proof. (Lemma 2) From Proposition 2 we know that EE(1) is monotone increasing in 1 and
bounded from below by 14s. It follows that 
E
E(1)  KE only if KE  14s and the first part
follows.
To prove the second part, notice that EE(1)  EE(KE)  KE for all 1  KE by the
monotonicity of EE(1) and the definition of KE . For 1  x1; EE(1) is constant at 14s so
for KE  14s there exists KE  x1 such that 
E
E(KE) = KE:
Proof. (Proposition 4)
In the no-entry equilibrium without innovation, the incumbent’s problem is to maximize
(1) = p1(1  1) + 
N
I (1)
subject to 1 2 KE .
When the no-entry constraint is not binding, the incumbent’s problem reduces to the stan-
dard maximization problem of a durable-goods monopolist, which is solved, for instance, by
Bulow (1982). That is, 1 = 3=5 and the respective first-period price is p1 = (9=10) sL.
For KE  3=5, the no-entry constraint is binding, i.e. the incumbent is constrained to
supply at least KE to prevent entry. To find the respective optimal first-period price, we need
to derive the first-period demand. That is, we need to determine, for any price p1, the 1-type
consumer who is indifferent between buying the durable good in period 1 for p1 or not. The
concavity of the total profit function implies that the optimal quantity is exactly KE : Collecting
these points yields statement 1 of the proposition.
To obtain statement 2, observe that the incumbent maximizes
(1) = p1(1  1) + 
I
I(1) KI
subject to 1 2 KE .
15See, for example, Choi and Shin (1992).
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Suppose first that the no-entry constraint is not binding. To find the optimal first-period
choice of the incumbent, we will proceed in the following way: (i) We compute the first-period
demand function in terms of the first-period cutoff type 1, given there is no entry in the second
period. Using Proposition 1, we obtain four ranges of 1 with different first-period demand and
profit functions. (ii) Second, we determine the optimum in each of the four ranges separately.
(iii) Finally, we compare the associated profits across different ranges, and select the one which
yields the highest total profit.
(i) Given that 0  1 < z1, the 1-type is given by 2sL1   p1 = sL1   pL , p1 =
(3=2) sL1.
Given that z1  1  z2, the 1-type is given by 2sL1   p1 = (sL + s) 1   pH , p1 =
1 (sL   s) + 12s (sL + s) = (sL + 2s) (1 + 1).
Given that z2  1  12 , the 1-type is given by 2sL1   p1 = (sL + s) 1   pH , p1 =
1 (3sL   s) =2.
Given that 12 < 1  1, the 1-type is given by sL1   p1 + (sL + s) 1   pU =
(sL + s) 1   pH , p1 = 1 (3sL   s) =2.
(ii) The next step is to determine the optimum of (1) in each of the four ranges. It is easy
to verify that, for 0  1 < z1, and z1  1 < z2 and z2  1  1=2, (1) attains its optimum
at the upper boundary of the relevant range of 1, respectively. For 1=2 < 1  1, the optimum
of (1) lies at 1 = (3sL + s) = (5sL + s).
(iii) It follows immediately from (ii) that 1 = (3sL + s) = (5sL + s) is the optimal
first-period choice given no entry threat. The respective optimal first-period price is p1 =
(9s2L   s
2
) = (10sL + 2s).
To complete the proof, observe that the incumbent is constrained by the no-entry set when
KE  (3sL + s) = (5sL + s). The concavity of the total profit function implies that the
optimal first period sales is obtained at the boundary, KE : To get the optimal first-period price
we substitute KE for 1 in the first-period demand obtained in step (i).
Proof. (Proposition 5)
To find the optimal first-period choice of the incumbent in the entry equilibrium, we proceed
in a similar way as in the proof of Proposition 4: (i) We derive the first-period demand function
in terms of the first-period cutoff type 1, given entry in the second period, where 1 is the
consumer type that is indifferent between buying and not buying the durable good in period
1 for price p1. Using Proposition 2, we obtain different first-period demand and hence profit
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functions for four ranges of 1. (ii) Second, we determine the optimum in each of the four
ranges separately. (iii) Finally, we compare the associated profits across different ranges, and
select the one which yields the highest total profit.
(i) Given that 0  1  x1, the 1-type is given 2sL1 p1 = sL1 pL, p1 = (3=2) sL1.
Given x1 < 1  x2, the 1-type is given by 2sL1   p1 = (sL + s) 1   pH , p1 =
(sL   s) 1 + 2s (sL + s) = (7sL + 8s) (1 + 1).
Given x2 < 1  x3, the 1-type is given by 2sL1  p1 = (sL + s) 1  pH , p1 = sL1
or sL1   p1 + (sL + s) 1   pH = (sL + s) 1   pH , p1 = sL1.
Given x3 < 1  1, the 1-type is given by sL1 p1 +(sL + s) 1 pH = (sL + s) 1 
pH , p1 = sL1.
(ii) The next step is to determine the optimum of (1) in each of the four ranges. It is easy
to verify that, for 0  1  x1, (1) attains its optimum at 1 = x1. For x1 < 1  x2, the
optimum of (1) lies at the lower boundary of the relevant range for high values of s=sL,
at 1 = x2 for low values of s=sL; and at x1 < 1 < x2 for medium values of s=sL. For
x2 < 1  x3 and x3 < 1  1, (1) attains its optimum at 1 = x3.
(iii) Comparing the associated profits across ranges yields 1 = x1 as the optimal first-
period choice. The respective optimal first-period price is hence p1 = (3=2) sLx1.
Proof. (Proposition 6)
If KE is empty, then the incumbent has no choice but to concede and play the entry equi-
librium. To prove the reverse, suppose that KE is non-empty and the incumbent plans to play
the entry equilibrium. Proposition 5 implies that the incumbent’s optimal decision for the first
period is to chooses 1 = x1. However Lemma 2 (Statement 2) implies that EE(x1) < 0 so that
the entrant cannot earn a positive profit from entry. Therefore entry does not take place, which
completes the proof.
Proof. (Proposition 7)
There is no possibility of leapfrogging in  N since there is only one generation of the
durable good. By Corollary 1, leapfrogging occurs in  I for z1 < 1 < 1=2. Since x1 is greater
than z1, leapfrogging occurs in the no-entry equilibrium with innovation for x1 < 1 < 1=2.
Finally, leapfrogging does not occur in the entry equilibrium: by Corollary 2 leapfrogging in
 E would require that x1 < 1 < x2 is satisfied, while the optimal first period sales quantity in
the entry equilibrium is x1.
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Proof. (Proposition 8)
Suppose that KE  14s such that KE is non-empty. Proposition 6 implies that the in-
cumbent will not play the entry equilibrium. Note that II(1) does not depend on KE and
the incumbent chooses to innovate only if II(1)   NI (1)  KI . In this equilibrium, the
incumbent chooses a 1  x1 such that EE(1) = KE whenever the no-entry constraint is
binding (statement 2 of Proposition 4). Hence, to prove the proposition, it suffices to show that
II(1)  
N
I (1) > 
E
E(1) is possible for some choice of s and sL.
Consider the case in which s is close to sL. Then z1 < x1 < x2 < z2  1=2 < x3. We
obtain that II(1)   NI (1) > EE(1) for x1  1 < z2 and II(1)   NI (1) = EE(1) for
z2  1  x3.
To show the second statement, assume that KE < 14s and KI < KE . In this case the
incumbent plays the entry equilibrium since the no-entry set is empty. Therefore the entrant
innovates even if the incumbent has a lower innovation cost.
Proof. (Proposition 9) First compute the total gain from trade under the entry deterrence
equilibrium without innovation:
WN = 2
Z 1
KE
sL d +
Z KE
1
2KE
sL d
= sL(1 
5
8
2KE)
Next consider the total gain from trade under entry equilibrium where the entrant innovates.
Proposition 2 and Proposition 5 imply the following total gain:
WE = 2
Z 1
x1
sL d +
Z 1
1
2
s d +
Z x1
1
2x1
sL d  KE
= sL(1 
5
8
x21) +
3
8
s  KE
If WE dominates WN for a given KE , then the entry equilibrium is more efficient than the
entry deterrence equilibrium without innovation. The computation above indicates that WE
dominates WN if 58sL(
2
KE   x
2
1) +
3
8s   KE  0. Hence it remains to show that W
E is
greater than WN whenever given KE is consistent with KE .
32
Recall that KE is the first period sales when the entrant makes 0 profit from the entry.
Proposition 2 implies that KE and KE are related as follows for 3 ranges:
KE =
8
>><
>>:
4s
(sL+s)
2
(3sL+4s)
2 if x3 < KE  35
s1   12s
sL+2s
sL+s
21 if x2  KE  x3
8s
(sL+s)
2
(7sL+8s)
2 (1 + 1)
2 if x1  KE  x2
(48)
Substituting KE into 58sL(
2
KE   x
2
1) +
3
8s   KE and evaluating it for different range of
KE , we can easily confirm that WE dominates WN for all ranges. The proof is complete.
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